US EditionAir-Gap Covert Channel Attack On Spread Spectrum Modulated Clocks (IETR, Lab-STICC)
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Air-Gap Covert Channel Attack On Spread Spectrum Modulated Clocks (IETR, Lab-STICC)
A new technical paper titled “Clock-to-Clock Modulation Covert Channel” was published by researchers at University of Rennes-INSA Rennes-IETR-UMR and University of South Brittany/Lab-STICC- UMR CNRS. Abstract “Various Electromagnetic (EM) attacks have been developed to modulate and utilize EM emanations for covert communication, including exploiting processors, memory modules, and peripheral interfaces. The exploitation of clock systems present…
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