The 17 Minutes that Preceded the "Unbelievable" Train Crash of Urda
14 Articles
14 Articles
The operator of the H24 of the Atocha station authorized the driver of the AVE train to resume the traffic with 'normal march' although the protocols indicate that the indication should have been 'go in sight', that is, at a maximum speed of 40 kilometers per hour
Iryo's driver explained, in her last communication with the control center, that she couldn't check the system and that's why she was still detained at the entrance signal.
With the security system down, Adif gave way to the AVE despite having the Iryo detained in the same canton. He traveled 25 kilometers without anyone correcting the order until colliding.
Upon finding “a blank signal”, the train has stopped and, “as the protocol indicates”, talks have begun until the crash has occurred.
A computer failure in the rail safety system, followed by possible human errors in the control centre, may be at the origin of the collision between two high-speed trains in Spain. According to the Spanish Government, the operator of the control centre will have spent about 17 minutes watching, on the screens, that the two trains were on a collision route, without giving any order to stop.
"Unconnect and reconnect the LZB. And resume the march. Under the protection of the BSL. With normal march." It is the order that Adif transmitted at 8.36 hours to the driver of the AVE 02080, minutes before it reached the Iryo 6076 in Urda (Toledo). THE PERIÓDICO has had access to the conversations that reconstruct the instructions given after the breakdown of the railway safety system and before the crash, which left at least 68 dead.
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